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While the majority of cognitive studies on auditory hallu-
cinations (AHs) have been conducted in schizophrenia
(SZ), an increasing number of researchers are turning their
attention to different clinical and nonclinical populations,
often using SZ findings as a model for research. Recent
advances derived from SZ studies can therefore be utilized
to make substantial progress on AH research in other
groups. The objectives of this article were to (1) present
an up-to-date review regarding the cognitive mechanisms
of AHs in SZ, (2) review findings from cognitive research
conducted in other clinical and nonclinical groups, and (3)
integrate these recent findings into a cohesive framework.
First, SZ studies show that the cognitive underpinnings of
AHs include self-source-monitoring deficits and executive
and inhibitory control dysfunctions as well as distortions in
top-down mechanisms, perceptual and linguistic processes,
and emotional factors. Second, consistent with SZ studies,
findings in other population groups point to the role of top-
down processing, abnormalities in executive inhibition, and
negative emotions. Finally, we put forward an integrated
model of AHs that incorporates the above findings.We sug-
gest that AHs arise from an interaction between abnormal
neural activation patterns that produce salient auditory sig-
nals and top-downmechanisms that include signal detection
errors, executive and inhibition deficits, a tapestry of
expectations and memories, and state characteristics
that influence how these experiences are interpreted. Emo-
tional factors play a particular prominent role at all levels
of this hierarchy. Our model is distinctively powerful in
explaining a range of phenomenological characteristics




Auditory hallucinations (AHs) are auditory experiences
that occur in the absence of a corresponding external stim-
ulation andwhich resemble a veridical perception. Strongly
identified with psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia
(SZ), AHs have traditionally been investigated in SZ pop-
ulations. A recent shift in AH research, however, has led
to a strategic focus on other clinical and nonclinical groups
on the basis of observations that hallucinations and
hallucination-like experiences are common in several psy-
chiatric and also nonpsychiatric populations (ie, they are
‘‘transdiagnostic’’). That such experiences do not map
closely onto specific disorders has recently prompted the
National Institute of Mental Health–driven Research Do-
main Criteria to devise new ways of classifying psychopa-
thology based on symptom dimensions.1 This approach
lends itself to investigations of symptoms such as AH,
which comprisemultiple phenomenological features.While
acknowledging that the phenomenological features differ
somewhat between groups, transdiagnostic studies may
shed some light on the mechanisms that are specific to
AH independently of other symptoms associated with SZ.
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Cognitive methods have been widely used since early
studies of AH. The power of cognitive approaches lies
in their ability to provide plausible and intuitive explan-
ations for subjective (ie, nonobservable) symptoms and
to generate predictions regarding associated neural
mechanisms that are testable using neuroscientific meth-
odologies such as magnetic resonance imaging and elec-
troencephalographs. Increasingly, researchers are
investigating AH in different population groups, often
applying cognitive findings and behavioral paradigms de-
veloped for SZ research. An up-to-date review regarding
the current knowledge on cognitive mechanisms of AH is
therefore needed so that advances can be made on the
basis of the existing body of evidence.
The first aim of this article is to present the most recent
theoretical developments in cognitive research pertaining
to AH. While several high-quality reviews of cognitive
mechanisms in AH have been published in the past,
this is the first time that different phenomenological fea-
tures of AH have been so comprehensively linked to their
theoretical model in one article. The second aim is to pro-
vide an overview of findings from cognitive investigations
of AH in non-SZ populations and compare the findings
with the SZ literature. The third aim of this article is to
amalgamate these findings into a new theoretical model
of AH that can provide explanations for a range of
phenomenological features in clinical and nonclinical
populations.
Cognitive Explanations for the Phenomenological Features
of AH in SZ
Approximately 70% of people with a diagnosis of SZ re-
port AH. It is widely accepted that AH in SZ are multi-
dimensional and heterogenous.2 In keeping with this
dimensional view of AH, separate explanations have
been used to account for the different phenomenological
features of AH, each potentially representing a particular
circuitry of brain structures and functions. We focus on 4
features that have been the most intensively researched:
(1) the failure of self-recognition, whereby the experience
is perceived as alien and separate from one’s own mental
processes; (2) reduced sense of control over the onset,
content, and frequency of AH; (3) the perceptual quality
of AH; and (4) the contribution of emotions.
Failure of Self-recognition (alienation)
One core feature of AH in SZ is that they are experienced
as somewhat separate from one’s own mental processes:
the core experience is that the hallucinated percept is
lacking in ‘‘self’’ attributes. In addition, and perhaps sec-
ondarily, the origin of these events tends to be incorrectly
attributed to an external agent.
Several explanations have been proposed for such fail-
ures of self-recognition. One explanation centers around
impairments in ‘‘self-monitoring’’ processes, whose role
is to predict the sensory consequences of one’s own
actions via forward modelling/efference copy mecha-
nisms.3,4 Such difficulties may cause mental events (par-
ticularly inner speech) to become isolated from predictive
mechanisms and misinterpreted as originating from an
external source. Analogous processes are thought to exist
for language (including inner speech), actions, and
thoughts, so that a failure in this system would lead to
broad difficulties in self-recognition. Another model pro-
poses dysfunctions in ‘‘source-monitoring,’’ which refer
to judgment processes that are used to make internal/ex-
ternal discriminations. These typically engage memory
and other decision-making processes that retrieve and
evaluate memory records in order to form a cohesive rep-
resentation of an experience. It has been proposed that
such source-monitoring disturbance results in an incom-
plete representation of mental events and consequently
a failure to identify their origins.5
Theoretical aspects of thesemodels have been criticized
on the grounds that they do not provide a comprehensive
account of the phenomenological diversity of AH.6 The
cognitive tasks used to assess self- or source monitoring
have also been criticized on methodological grounds.
Typically, these require participants to monitor volun-
tary movements online or to identify whether items in
memory originated from the self or another (‘‘agency’’
tasks). However, errors may be the result of cognitive
processes other than self- or source monitoring, such
as response biases or difficulties in appraising ambiguous
stimuli that could overshadow patients’ ability to recog-
nize their own actions or mental events.7
Despite these criticisms, evidence supporting the link
between AH and self- and source-monitoring deficits is
strong, and few studies have failed to replicate these find-
ings. A recent meta-analysis showed that self- and source-
monitoring impairments were consistently reported
across a range of paradigms, interstimulus intervals,
and modalities in patients with SZ and particularly those
withAH.8 Such dysfunctions were thought to occur in the
earlier, rather than later, stages of information process-
ing, although such early deficits would undoubtedly im-
pact on higher-order processes. One problem with this
literature is that monitoring deficits also occur with other
symptoms (eg, Frith et al4). While a possibility exists that
the cognitive underpinnings of AH may be shared across
some symptoms, it also suggests that such impairments
are not sufficient for AH to occur.
A related approach to recognition problems has been
provided by Signal Detection Theory (SDT) models,
which state that all information recognition takes place
in the presence of some uncertainty and that processing
relies on both pattern recognition (perceptual sensitivity)
and biases in responding.9 This approach has been used
to test the source-monitoring hypothesis, and the theory
suggests that hallucinating individuals may have relatively
ters et al.
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unimpaired perceptual sensitivity but show lax decision
criteria about accepting an signal as real and biases in
responding that misattribute events to a nonself source.9
A strength of this model is the differentiation between sig-
nal detection and response biases, consistent with the idea
that attributions must be differentiated from earlier pro-
cessing stages. It is also compatible with the above models
because self-monitoring problems might contribute to in-
correct decisions about the source of information, partic-
ularly for predictive mechanisms linked to self-generated
actions. Recent versions of this SDT model10 posit that
perceptual hypervigilance (perhaps linked to anxiety)
enhances biases in responding and thus produces a higher
likelihood of errors in cognitive processing and of accept-
ing a signal as real. The desire to reduce uncertainty under
threat also leads to increased detection of ambiguous sig-
nals, a reduction in auditory threshold, and thus halluci-
natory experiences.
As above, one problem with this theory is that SDT
impairments are not specific to AH (eg, Harvey11). In ad-
dition, the ability to make rapid and overconfident judg-
ments about the nature of perceptions is a processing
style that is commonly linked to delusions, pointing to
the possibility that such underpinnings of AH may be re-
lated to cognitive processes common to many positive
symptoms.
While the above models provide explanations for ver-
bal and nonverbal types of AH, inner speech theories
have focused on providing accounts of verbal AH.
They suggest that information regarding the misattribu-
tion of inner speech might be gained by comparing the
phenomenology of inner speech in hallucinating individ-
uals with ‘‘normal’’ inner speech.12 One such model
builds on the observed distinction between ‘‘expanded’’
(ie, possessing an overt dialogic structure) and ‘‘con-
densed’’ (ie, abbreviated) forms of inner speech and pro-
poses that AH occur during the transition from
condensed to expanded inner dialog, particularly during
periods of high cognitive load or stress.12 Although exist-
ing data on the phenomenology of inner speech in hallu-
cinating individuals cannot yet fully address this model
(see Langdon et al13), such phenomenology-basedmodels
are useful in pointing to the evolution and transformation
of neural information into increasingly differentiated sig-
nals that are subject to modification by factors such as
emotions.
In summary, despite different explanations for self-
recognition deficits in AH, studies generally converge
on the finding that AH are linked to monitoring deficits
and misattributions. One key difficulty with this litera-
ture is that cognitive deficits in self-/source monitoring
and SDT have been linked to other symptoms of SZ.
Thus, while these deficits may still play an important
role for AH formation and maintenance, it appears
that such cognitive mechanisms may underpin a range
of other psychotic symptoms.
Sense of Control
From the patients’ perspective, hallucinations are often
described as unintentional and intrusive.14,15 This
reduced sense of control may be used by individuals to
differentiate hallucinated voices from one’s own verbal
thoughts,16 although much variability exists in the degree
to which AH (and indeed verbal thoughts) are perceived
as controllable.17 Cognitive explanations have thus incor-
porated the idea that AH involve ‘‘a failure to control the
contents of consciousness,’’18 which is generally assumed
to reflect a breakdown in one or more of the executive
functions which control and regulate thought and action.
The differentiation of executive functions into separable
(though correlated) components has provided a useful
framework for considering reduced sense of control in
AH.
Inhibition. Early studies of AH tended to apply the term
‘‘inhibition’’ fairly loosely and reported negative findings
on measures of negative priming and interference (eg,
Peters et al19). Since that time, there has been accumulat-
ing evidence demonstrating a link between AH and a par-
ticular type of suppression, termed ‘‘intentional cognitive
inhibition’’ (eg, Waters et al5). These studies draw on ex-
tensive evidence from cognitive neuroscience that inhibi-
tion involves a family of processes, each with its own
characteristic operating mechanisms. For example, dif-
ferent aspects of inhibitory processing may be differenti-
ated, particularly between cognitive vs behavioral
inhibition, intentional vs automatic inhibition, and inhi-
bition vs interference control. Studies that have used this
model together with tasks demanding the volitional sup-
pression of memory events and irrelevant memories
tested the prediction that AH in SZ involve a deficit in
intentional cognitive inhibition.5 The degree of inhibitory
impairment was significantly correlated with the severity
of AH. Moreover, the association was specific to AH be-
cause the number of inhibitory failures was not associ-
ated with other symptoms. Stated differently,
a particular form of prefrontal inhibitory control may al-
low auditory signals to be relatively functionally auton-
omous and difficult to control effectively.
Attention and Working Memory Updating. There has
been a long-standing interest in the contribution of atten-
tion and working memory processes to AH,14 although
early studies concluded that tasks assessing the phono-
logical store and loops were unrelated to positive symp-
toms (eg, David and Lucas20). Nonetheless, recent
functional imaging data show that patients with AH ex-
hibit reduced activity in verbal working memory circuits,
albeit in the absence of deficits in working memory per-
formance.21 That verbal working memory neural circuits
are associated with AH but not behavioral performance,
perhaps reflects a broader pattern of language processing
3
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deficits in AH.22 While cognitive evidence for attention
and working memory updating remains inconclusive,
the role of attention is clearly relevant in early auditory
sensory detection mechanisms. Though not directly
linked to the sense of control, attentional processes might
operate in AH through the determination of resource al-
located toward processing and correction of errors dur-
ing information processing.10
Set-Shifting. Hugdahl23 has argued that a proper un-
derstanding of the neurocognitive basis of AH demands
inclusion of ‘‘the ability to shift attention away from the
voices’’. He proposes that AH involve both bottom-up
internal activation of left-hemisphere speech perception
areas and dysfunctional top-down executive control.
On a dichotic listening paradigm, which lateralizes stim-
ulus input, patients with SZ and frequent AH failed to
demonstrate the expected right ear advantage, indicative
of a functional deficit in the left perisylvian region.
Reduced responsiveness to right ear stimulation is
thought to arise because left-hemisphere language
regions are already engaged in processing; ie, patients
are already ‘‘tuned in’’ to the voices. In addition, patients
with AH exhibited difficulties in shifting attentional focus
to the opposite ear. The implication is that AH involve
a difficulty in the modulation of attention and in achiev-
ing top-down executive control of voices and that the
inability to shift might be a negative consequence of
increased attentional focus on hallucinated voices.
In summary, executive and inhibitory control dysfunc-
tions have been linked to AH. Intentional inhibition def-
icits have also been linked to a reduced sense of control
associated with AH. Theoretically, deficits in intentional
inhibition can cause mental events to be experienced as
unintended and intrusive.5 A lack of anticipatory repre-
sentation would also contribute to this reduced sense of
control. Deficits in attention and set shifting may play an
altogether different role, by determining expectations and
resources to be allocated to these unintended auditory
signals and by limiting the ability to reallocate and trans-
fer attention to other adaptive information.
Perceptual Quality
A cardinal phenomenological feature of hallucinations is
their perceptual quality. A person who hallucinates
‘‘hears’’ sounds and voices that can be described in terms
of parameters of loudness, pitch, and clarity. These dis-
tinctive characteristics of AH have been explained in
terms of top-down perceptual processing.
Top-down factors reflect the influence of internal fac-
tors and stored representations on perception, which
include prior knowledge and memories, perceptual expect-
ations, and mental imagery. Given that all acts of percep-
tion are composed of an interaction between bottom-up
input and top-down constraints, an imbalance between
these factors in perception has been suggested to activate
percepts in the absence of external stimulation. Several the-
ories posit that a blend of distorted input from bottom-up
sensory information and aberrant top-down factors cause
AH.24 Recent models25 suggest that impairments in hier-
archical perceptual processing, underpinned by structural
and functional neurological abnormalities, are a core ab-
normality in SZ. The model is also based on the fact that
processing of sensory information from the environment is
not passive, as it is quickly combined with stored memory
representations, other sensory experiences, and top-down
expectations. What is experienced is thus a cascade of pro-
cesses that produces a subjective perception of reality.
Over time, this inaccurate processing leads to ‘‘hard wir-
ing’’ of networks which produce a distorted subjective ex-
perience of sensory input and reality distortions.
Empirical evidence for increased top-down processing
in SZ patients with ‘‘verbal’’ AH is mostly derived from
SDT studies with tasks using verbal stimulus detection in
noisy circumstances,14,26 suggestibility and expectan-
cies,27,28 and semantic expectations.26 These results sup-
port the conclusion that aberrant top-down processing,
particularly in the form of strong semantic expectations,
may contribute to the experience of AH, at least those of
a verbal nature. In addition, the notion of suggestibility
provides an interesting explanation for the reporting of
a phenomenological experience in the absence of a clear
external signal. If so, individuals with AH would be more
amenable to conditioning and effects of implicit or ex-
plicit suggestion.29 However, it does not explain results
in their entirety given that differences are reported in
decision-making biases rather than sensitivity to detect
biases.9
Consistent with an auditory sensory-conditioning
model, one recent study indicated that hallucinating
patients acquire auditory conditioned hallucinations
more quickly than do nonhallucinating controls, and
these AH are more resistant to extinction.30 This effect
may determine whether subjective experiences are
reported as hallucinations or real percepts.31
Emotional Quality
A range of positive and negative emotions are associated
with AH, and studies now view emotions as intrinsically
linked to the content, frequency, and beliefs about AH
(eg, ref. 32,33). Evidence comes from multiple sources.
The affective consequences of AH in psychiatric patients
tend to be negative (though not always), and common
feelings reported by patients with AH include anxiety
and depression.16,32 Furthermore, emotional responses
to voices are often related to beliefs and appraisals of
the voice rather than to the experience per se.33 For ex-
ample, beliefs that voices are malevolent tend to be asso-
ciated with negative emotions (eg, fear and depression),
whereas beliefs that voices are benevolent tend to be
4
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associated with positive emotions (eg, enthusiasm and
respect). Increased distress in voice hearers is also related
to a lack of ability to control the AH, perhaps through the
influence of rumination processes on the frequency of the
experience.34 Finally, a host of evidence indicates the im-
portant role of emotions as a trigger ofAH, as amaintain-
ing factor,32 and in determining the need for care.35
Further support for the role of emotions is derived
from links between dissociation and hearing voices.36
Many studies have also reported a specific association be-
tween hallucinations and childhood trauma, prompting
recent suggestions of a ‘‘2 hit’’ model of AH in which
a combination of cognitive deficit and trauma lead to
a high risk of hallucinations in adulthood.37 However,
the presence of AH in nonhelp seeking community sam-
ples suggests that the experience itself is not always prob-
lematic, with evidence for a more positive emotional
valence of AH experiences in those not seeking psychiatric
help.38
Methodological Issues in Cognitive Studies of AH in SZ
A number of methodological lessons can be gained from
a long history of AH research in SZ. First, with some
exceptions, cognitive tools can be limited in their ability
to engage fully the theoretical constructs of interest, em-
phasizing the importance of striving for high construct
validity when choosing tasks. Cross-disciplinary work
might help to identify knowledge gaps and to bridge
those gaps through the integration of different method-
ologies. Increased collaborations between cognitive (and
linguistic) sciences, electrophysiological approaches, and
neuroimaging will benefit the development of theories.
For example, different tools and approaches maybe
used to test hypotheses derived from one discipline.
This rests upon collaborative efforts and possibly the
pooling of data between centers.
Second, the selection and grouping of participants is
critical. An adequate design might compare patients
with the same diagnosis who differ on the presence/
absence of state-related AH, although a group of patients
who have never experienced AH would be necessary to
tease out state/trait factors. Few longitudinal studies of
AH exist, although these are useful for observing the fluc-
tuating nature of symptoms and underlying mechanisms
in the same participants. Issues of symptom assessment
are also of decisive importance. The presence and severity
of different AH features must be assessed using well-
validated scales2 and clearly detailed in scientific articles.
In addition to AH symptoms, the assessment and report-
ing of other symptoms are important. Many studies of
AH, for instance have shown that cognitive deficits are
shared across other symptoms, often delusions, or passiv-
ity symptoms. The role of insight has received little atten-
tion, although poor insight might play an important role
in some aspects of AH phenomenology (see ‘‘Cognitive
Model of AH’’ section). Thus, studies must report in
a transparent manner on the type and range of clinical
experiences seen in their samples so that the specificity
of findings to AH may be examined. Similarly, duration
of illness and clinical status are important variables that
will influence test results. Finally, a number of other con-
founds can limit the interpretability of cognitive findings.
These include the contributing effects of variability in in-
telligence, attention andworkingmemory, effects ofmed-
ication, psychiatric comorbidities, and possible social
and psychological results of the stigma and negative expe-
riences. While these variables cannot always be con-
trolled, researchers should record these in detail and
take into consideration that multiple factors may impact
on performance.
Cognitive Investigations of AH in Populations Other Than
SZ
When compared with the number of cognitive studies in
SZ, fewer studies have been conducted in other popula-
tion groups. Yet, the study of AH in non-SZ populations
is a particularly useful methodological strategy given its
potential for understanding the mechanisms of AH inde-
pendently of other symptoms associated with SZ. Studies
with non-SZ populations can therefore elucidate and test
hypotheses about the causes of AH without interference
from other symptom profiles. In this section, we review
available cognitive findings derived from studies in different
groups.
The most intensively studied population includes
healthy individuals who at times experience AH. The es-
timated prevalence of AH in this group is approximately
15%. Phenomenologically, AH in these nonclinical pop-
ulations may be different to those in SZ, mostly in the
domain of emotional content of hallucinations and the
amount of control over AH.38 By contrast, nonself rec-
ognition, perceived location of voices, number of voices,
loudness, and personification do not tend to differentiate
between psychotic and healthy individuals. Cognitive
studies have often focused on individuals who score
high on scales such as the revised Launay-Slade Halluci-
nation Scale (LSHS-R). Such individuals are thought to
be ‘‘prone’’ to AH, although it is important to note that
the LSHS assesses a range of psychological constructs,
including different hallucination modalities, intrusive
thoughts, and vivid daydreams. Although not strictly
assessing AH, such studies can be potentially informative
given that potential confounds associated with psychiat-
ric research, such as medication and chronicity, can be
avoided. Cognitive investigations show that their pattern
of performance tends to be similar to that of SZ groups,
albeit at attenuated levels. Consistent with the observa-
tion that self-recognition problems and complex percep-
tual quality are phenomenological features that are
present in both clinical and nonclinical samples, studies
5
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in healthy people demonstrate spontaneous biases and
misattribution39 as well as excessive top-down process-
ing.40 By contrast, findings on self-monitoring tasks
have been rather mixed, with some studies showing
self-recognition difficulties,41 and others finding no rela-
tion between hallucination-proneness (incorporating all
modalities) and self-recognition for actions42.
While the reduced sense of control is a less salient fea-
ture in nonclinical individuals compared with SZ groups,
studies still show broad dysfunctions on tasks of inten-
tional inhibition.43 Other support for executive dysfunc-
tions in this population comes from links between AH
proneness and intrusive thoughts, ruminations, and
attempts at thought suppression.44 Certain aspects of
metacognitive style such as beliefs about the uncontrol-
lability of thoughts have also been reported,44 although
these are thought to be largely mediated by the effects of
comorbid symptoms.45
Phenomenological studies of AH in nonclinical groups
show that the emotional quality of AH is less negative
and intrusive than in SZ, yet findings showmore negative
emotions, and dysfunctional emotional regulation strat-
egies, when compared with healthy individuals without
these symptoms.46 Executive dysfunctions and emotion
processing difficulties perhaps reflect the potential vul-
nerability of these individuals to experiencing psychosis.
Another approach has been to define an AH analog
group in terms of susceptibility to hypnagogic and
hypnopompic hallucinations. Studies have showed that
these may also be linked to executive and inhibitory
dysfunctions.47
Despite the informative nature of transdiagnostic stud-
ies, there is a paucity of cognitive investigations con-
ducted in other clinical populations. Approximately
15% of individuals with bipolar disorder report AH, al-
though these have been rarely described phenomenolog-
ically. Studies show that AHs in this group are linked to
difficulties on a task of self-monitoring, as demonstrated
on a voice-distortion paradigm.48
Studies of borderline personality disorder show that
AHs have an estimated prevalence of 20%–50%, with
phenomenological features that are similar to those in
SZ. Cognitive studies in this group have demonstrated
links betweenAH and deficits in executive functions (par-
ticularly inhibition).43 Negative emotions might also be
important as an etiological factor of AH in borderline
personality disorder, with studies reporting increased in-
cidence of childhood trauma and emotional abuse (inde-
pendent of the presence of paranoid delusions) and a loss
of emotional regulation, eg, Kingdon et al.49
It is interesting to note that visual hallucinations in
Parkinson’s disease (PD) are linked to both source-
monitoring and inhibitory control difficulties.50 As in
SZ, poor source-monitoring and inhibitory control
thus appear to be a risk factor for the presence of hallu-
cinations in PD. Deficits in executive control have also
been reported in individuals with epilepsy presenting
with a history of frequent AH and to (visual) hallucina-
tions in eye disease.51 Thus, there may be general, ie,
cross-modal mechanisms that underlie hallucinations re-
gardless of the diagnostic category.
Together, the evidence points to shared impairment in
inhibitory functions, emotional problems, and top-down
mechanisms across different population groups. While
nonself recognition is a key clinical feature of AH across
all groups, evidence regarding the role of self-/source
monitoring is inconsistent, although thismight be a reflec-
tion of the lack of investigations in this area. Altogether,
these findings mirror the pattern of cognitive perfor-
mance demonstrated in SZ. Conclusions from these
observations are limited, however, given publication
biases that ensure that only positive findings are reported
in the literature. While similarities in deficits are empha-
sized, much less is known regarding how cognitive
profiles differ between groups.
Cognitive Model of AH
Here, we combine evidence from the above into a cohesive
model. We build on a model that was first proposed by
Frith and Dolan52 and subsequently elaborated by
Aleman et al24 and Hugdahl.23 This model (see figure
1) comprises multidimensional elements, but it focuses
on the fact that AHs are essentially perceptions. Like
all perceptions, AHs arise through an interaction between
information arising from neural activations and top-
down activity. Cognitive, imaging, electrophysiological,
and phenomenological findings associated with AH
can complement and support this explanation.
Model of AH in SZ
There are 2 types of functional brain systems that are
needed for this interaction. One (the source) involves sa-
lient auditory stimuli that provide the basic signal for
AH. This is thought to arise from hyperactivation in
functional networks involving the auditory cortex that
generate aberrant auditory signals, possibly due to a de-
viant trigger of activations in language-related areas re-
sponsible for AH.22,53 Anomalous activations might be
determined by environmental factors and/or internal
(eg, emotional) conditions. One consequence of such ab-
normal neural activation includes auditory signals that
exceed perceptual threshold, thus causing unexpectedly
intense (hypersalient) sensory information. This may
go some way toward explaining source-monitoring diffi-
culties because it would bias such internal material to-
ward being perceived as alien and separate from one’s
internal mental processes and as arising from external
influences. Specific forms of auditory signals (eg, forms
of inner speech, intrusive memories) may be particularly
more likely to be converted into AH and conceivably
6
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account for some of the verbal phenomenological prop-
erties of the AH.
The other processes involve top-down mechanisms
that influence the form, content, and meaning of AH.
Different modes of attention, cognitive control capacity,
prior knowledge/experience, and emotional processes ex-
ert influence over form and content. The sequence of pro-
cesses might be as follows: First, deficits in signal
detection produce increased detection of ambiguous or
salient signals and increased likelihood of accepting the
signal as real and meaningful. Second, such information
fails to be suppressed by faulty intentional inhibition
mechanisms and becomes functionally autonomous.
This would contribute to the failure to contain and con-
trol effectively the onset and frequency of these auditory
signals. Over time, expectations and hypervigilance
would increase the likelihood of such experiences being
repeated (creating a sort of ‘‘cognitive cue’’), leading
to increased biases and a reduction in threshold in accept-
ing the signal as being real. The content of AH may be
determined by factors such as perceptual expectations,
mental imagery, and prior experience/knowledge (eg,
memories) that shape a perception of reality that is idi-
osyncratic and highly personalized. As such, voices of
family members and radio personalities, the voice of
God, and sounds of dogs barking, can be recognized.
Finally, the meaning of AH is determined by state and
trait characteristics, influencing how these experiences are
interpreted. In the case of SZ, the presence of reduced
insight, delusional beliefs, negative schemas/beliefs about
oneself (e.g. low self-esteem), beliefs about the world, and
negative affect all combine to produce a complex and elab-
orate system of beliefs. For example, the perception may be
seen as a plot from theCentral IntelligenceAgency (CIA) or
as a message about the need to save the world.
Emotions play a particularly prominent role at all lev-
els of this model (source, form, content, and meaning),
also perhaps by providing the first traumatic insult
(hit) in this ontogeny.37 Emotional events linked to
trauma, dissociations, and other intense negative emo-
tions may influence the source of AH by increasing the
rate of firing of neural activation and aberrant auditory
signals. They are also likely to shape the form and content
of signals, due to an ‘‘automatic’’ prioritizing of emo-
tional processing, which ensures that emotional and per-
sonally salient material is preferentially processed over
neutral information. This would produce biases toward
negative information, hypervigilance, and negative sche-
mas that will further enhance the processing and memory
recall of affective material. Traumatic life-events also
produce intrusive memories that will impact on the fre-
quency of the experience and perception about
Verbal/non verbal, and 
inner/outer distinction determined 
by differences in neural activity 
along the ventral ‘what’ and 
dorsal ‘where’ pathways  
Errors in processing self- and 
non-self information.  
Deficits in signal 
detection = accepting 
signal as real  
Abnormal activation of auditory 




Prior history, mental 
imagery, fantasy, past 
memories 





Reduced sense of control over 
onset and frequency of the 
experience 
A highly personalised auditory 
experience that is perceived to 
be real 
‘First hit’                    +    Emotion      =   hypervigilance                     particularly for negative              trauma, depression, anxiety            Depression, anxiety 
Traumatic insult             Modulation        and biases                     information                        negative memories                        Paranoia, fear 
Fig. 1. Temporal unfolding of auditory hallucinations (AHs) in clinical and nonclinical populations (the boxes shaded in gray represent
processing thatmaybemore characteristic of schizophrenia and that differentiate clinical and nonclinical AH): In thismodel, AH arise from
an interaction between (a) signals arising fromoveractivation of auditory brain neural activity and (b) a range of top-downmechanisms that
produce a highly complex andmultidimensional experience. These top-downmechanisms include: (1) deficits in signal detection that lead to
errors in processing; (2) intentional inhibition deficits that contribute to a diminished sense of control over this perceptual experience;
(3) a background of expectations, imagery, andmemories that provide information that is personally relevant; (4) contributions from lack of
insight and delusional beliefs that provide a set of beliefs about AH; and (5) the contribution of emotions that impacts on all aspects of
processing and that ensures that emotional material is processed over neutral information. This model can be used to explain variations in
phenomenological features (bottomrow,dotted lines), so that the severityor locationof thecognitivedeficitsdetermine individualdifferences
in the extent to which AH features are present.
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uncontrollability. Finally, over time, this would influence
more broadly aspects such as beliefs and meaning attrib-
uted to AH (omnipotence etc.).
We noted above that space limitations prevent us from
reviewing other relevant phenomenological features such
as variability in verbal vs nonverbal content and the in-
ner-outer space distinction.While little evidence exists re-
garding cognitive underpinnings of these AH features,
neuroimaging evidence points to different pathways
that can provide explanations for variations in such fea-
tures. Verbal and nonverbal AH may stem from abnor-
malities at different hierarchical levels along the ventral
‘‘what’’ neural pathway, whose role is to process sound
identity in the temporal cortices and inferior frontal cor-
tex. By contrast, inner-outer space localization may be
due to differences in activation in the dorsal ‘‘where’’ neu-
ral pathway, which projects along the planum temporale,
frontal, and parietal cortical areas. In sum, differences in
neural activity provide the functional basis for verbal and
nonverbal AH and for inner-outer distinctions, which
therefore may provide the basic auditory material (the
‘‘source’’) for AH. Top-down processes, as explained
above, would further ‘‘shape’’ this signal into a perceived
reality that is personally relevant. As an example, neural
activity in the planum temporale with projection to the
inferior parietal cortex may contribute to external sound
localization, while increased activation in premotor areas
might engage ‘‘voices’’ rather than nonverbal sounds. A
person showing hypervigilance for a stimulus that is emo-
tional and self-relevant would be likely to perceive this
signal as a critical verbal remark, ie, located outside
the head.
In summary, we propose that AH arise through an in-
teraction between hypersalient auditory signals (the
source) and top-down mechanisms comprising different
modes of error-processing, cognitive control, prior knowl-
edge/experience, that govern the form and content of AH,
together with an influence of state characteristics (insight,
belief systems, etc.) that determine the meaning. Emo-
tional processing plays a prominent role, with an initial
traumatic insult creating a vulnerability for experiencing
psychosis, and impacting at all levels of processing
in this hierarchy. Finally, phenomenological variations
may be explained by individual differences in severity of
deficits and localization of neural activity. Clearly, there
are many subtypes of AH2 that require different combina-
tions of processes.54
Cognitive Model of AH in Non-SZ Populations
The model proposed above can be used to explain varia-
tions in AH features and cognitive findings in popula-
tions other than SZ (figure 1). Essentially, an auditory
signal is an obligatory element for hallucinations to oc-
cur. Though this has not been yet pursued in non-SZ pop-
ulations, it should be possible to examine for increased
spontaneous auditory neural signals and reduced neural
suppression during covert speech in these groups. Here,
we propose that, similarly to processes involved in SZ and
consistent with evidence to date, top-down mechanisms
comprising a mix of deficits in error processing, and
faulty intentional inhibition mechanisms would lead to
increased attention of these aberrant perceptual signals
and a failure to suppress such signals.
Other top-down processes, however, may be the key fac-
tors differentiating clinical from nonclinical hallucina-
tions. Emotional factors may be one such differentiating
factor. The timing, or severity, of trauma and negative
prior experiences may occur outside a critical window,
leading to a different AH experience with more positive
emotional valence, and reduced hypervigilance and
help-seeking behavior in nonpsychotic individuals. Per-
sonal traits (eg, presence of insight) in healthy populations
would also influence how these experiences are perceived,
such that these experiences are interpreted in the context of
a benign rationale, with an absence of an ‘‘active’’ search
for a meaning as is the case in psychotic individuals.
Clearly, a number of issues require clarification. For
example, we must determine the origin of auditory sig-
nals, and the processes by which these are activated, in
particular, which cognitive or environmental cues con-
tribute to spontaneous activation, and under what con-
ditions. Further differentiation is also needed in the
processes underpinning AH that distinguish psychotic,
nonpsychotic clinical, and nonclinical individuals. Un-
fortunately, insufficient evidence currently exists regard-
ing the phenomenological characteristics and cognitive
and biological underpinnings of AH in different condi-
tions. Emerging evidence will lead to greater understand-
ing and clearer predictions regarding the processes
underlying AH in different groups.
Concluding Comments
Altogether, our knowledge of AH is slowly accumulating,
and we are now in a position to provide increasingly com-
prehensive models of AH that can incorporate the broad
phenomenological variations. The above is part of a pro-
cess of building a research foundation that may, in the
short term, inform novel practical and theoretical
approaches toward investigations of AH. It is hoped
that this review on the current state of knowledge will
help researchers in selecting and incorporating the
most appropriate research focus for their transdiagnostic
research onAH. In the longer term, such approaches may
facilitate the classification of patients in research and
guide the best approaches for clinical diagnosis and treat-
ment. In the meantime, investigations using novel task
design, careful phenomenological assessment, and
cross-disciplinary research protocols are urgently needed
to improve the power of cognitive approaches to assess
mechanisms underlying AH. It is clear that an important
8
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avenue for research is to cross borders between cognition,
phenomenology, imaging, and neurobiological tools.
Such a framework that interfaces directly with different
branches of science will facilitate progress in understand-
ing underlying etiology and maintenance of AH and in
developing new therapeutic interventions.
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